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Thinking and policy on corporate regulation havebeen in flux during recent decades. Whereas theneoliberal discourse of the 1980s emphasized
deregulation and corporate rights, the corporate so-
cial responsibility (CSR) agenda of the 1990s stressed
corporate self-regulation and voluntary initiatives in-
volving, for example, codes of conduct, improvements
in occupational health and safety, environmental man-
agement systems, social and environmental reporting,
support for community projects and philanthropy. As
the limits of self-regulation became apparent, and as
the regulatory capacity or willingness of developing
country governments, international bodies and trade
unions continued to decline, alternative regulatory
approaches have emerged. These have centred on co-
regulation, in which a combination of government,
multilateral, civil society and business interests engage
in public-private partnerships (PPPs) and multi-
stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) associated with stand-
ard setting, reporting, monitoring, auditing and cer-
tification. More recently there have been increasing
calls for corporate accountability and a renewed in-
terest in international regulation of transnational cor-
porations (TNCs). From the perspective of develop-
ment and good governance, how effective are these
different approaches?
UNRISD Research on
Corporate Social Responsibility
UNRISD work on TNCs and CSR commenced
in the mid-1990s in the context of a broader
inquiry into the social effects of globalization.
In the late 1990s, the Institute examined
whether corporate claims associated with the
greening of business in developing countries
were reflected in reality, and analysed the types
of pressures and incentives that were prompt-
ing some companies to change their environ-
mental policies. In 2000, UNRISD launched a
three-year inquiry into the potential and lim-
its of voluntary initiatives for improving the so-
cial and environmental performance of
business. Under this project, research was car-
ried out in Brazil, India, Mexico, Peru, the Phil-
ippines and South Africa. During 2003, studies
were also conducted on UN-business partner-
ships; multistakeholder standard-setting, moni-
toring and certification schemes; the corporate
accountability movement; and international
regulation of TNCs.
Research Findings
Company codes of conduct
Codes of conduct, unilaterally designed by corpora-
tions or business and industry associations, have con-
stituted one of the main forms of corporate self-regu-
lation. Company codes are heavily concentrated in
sectors where brand reputation and export orienta-
tion are important. Codes addressing labour issues
tend to be associated with the garment, footwear,
sporting goods, toy and retail sectors; those concerned
with environmental aspects are likely to be found in
chemicals, forestry, oil and mining. Company and
business association codes are often of limited scope,
focusing on working conditions in core enterprises
and development concerns that have a high profile in
the richer industrialized countries, such as sweatshops,
deforestation and pollution. Issues such as labour
rights, the rights and responsibilities of suppliers and
home-based workers, and independent monitoring of
TNCs often receive less attention.
Notwithstanding the limitations of codes, they can
and have generated benefits for various stakeholders,
widening the concept of corporate responsibility in
relation to environmental management, workplace
conditions and company-community relations. Be-
cause of codes, TNCs increasingly accept the notion
of extended responsibility for the activities of their
affiliates and some suppliers. By focusing attention
on how goods are producedas opposed to what is
producedcodes have the potential to broaden con-
sumer interest and mobilization beyond questions of
price and quality, to the social and environmental
implications of their choices. There is a danger, how-
ever, of codes being seen as something more than they
really are, and used to deflect criticism, reduce the
demand for external regulation and undermine the
position of trade unions.
Multistakeholder initiatives
The limitations of company codes of conduct and cor-
porate self-regulation have been addressed in recent
years through what are often called multistakeholder
initiatives, involving standard setting and the promo-
tion of dialogue, reporting, monitoring, auditing, and
certification related to social, environmental and hu-
man rights issues.
There are considerable differences in the ways MSIs
aim to improve corporate social and environmental
policy and performance, all of which have advantages
and disadvantages. Some emphasize certification and/
Corporate Social Responsibility
and Business Regulation
How should transnational corporations be regulated to minimize
malpractice and improve their social, environmental and human rights
record in developing countries?
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or monitoring of policies and management systems; some are
concerned not only with process, but also with certifying
actual performance and impacts; others focus on voluntary re-
porting and best-practice learning. A few have developed com-
plaints procedures to deal with specific cases of malpractice.
Many MSIs assume the organizational form of non-governmen-
tal organizations (NGOs), although industry, trade union and
multilateral organizations have also taken the lead in some
cases. MSIs have been somewhat successful in addressing cer-
tain weaknesses associated with corporate self-regulation. Of
particular note have been their attempts to impose a degree of
coherency on the confusing proliferation of company codes,
and the attention they have directed to issues of labour rights,
independent monitoring, the responsibilities of suppliers in
TNC value chains, and international labour, environmental
and human rights law. By their very nature, MSIs bring into
decision-making processes a broader range of actors and can,
therefore, have positive implications in terms of democratic
global governance. But there are major differences in the ex-
tent to which they integrate trade unions, local-level monitor-
ing and verification organizations in developing countries, and
Southern actors more generally. Questions have also arisen
regarding the accountability, legitimacy and credibility of some
MSIs and the NGOs with a dominant position in these new
systems of corporate regulation, including their representation
of workers interests and their close association with the cor-
porations they seek to regulate.
Examples of Multistakeholder Initiatives
! Certification schemesISO14001, SA8000,
Forest Stewardship Council, Marine Steward-
ship Council
! Anti-sweatshop initiativesFair Labor
Association, Worker Rights Consortium, Clean
Clothes Campaign, Global Alliance for Workers
and Communities, Worldwide Responsible
Apparel Production
! United Nations Global Compactencourages
companies to adhere to nine principles derived
from international labour, environmental and
human rights law
! Global Reporting Initiative, Ethical Trading
Initiative and AA1000, which attempt to improve
certain aspects of management, monitoring and
reporting systems, as well as learning through
stakeholder engagement
! Global framework agreements between TNCs
and international trade union organizations
Most MSIs have spent their early years absorbed in compli-
cated experimental or pilot phases involving relatively few com-
panies. This experience has yielded important lessons and fa-
cilitated constructive adaptation, but it has also raised serious
questions regarding the extent to which such initiatives can be
effectively scaled up and reach more than a small proportion
of the worlds TNCs and other large companies. The cost and
complexity of many MSI procedures, the sheer scale of TNC
operations and the limited capacities of many of the NGOs or
other organizations involved inhibit both quality and scale.
Furthermore, most firms remain fairly immune to the pres-
sures and incentives that are driving CSR and that might en-
courage them to participate in MSIs.
Transnational Corporations, Certification
and Reporting: Participation in Selected
Multistakeholder Initiatives
AS OF 2002: TOTAL TNCS = 64,000; TOTAL AFFILIATES = 870,000
Multistakeholder initiative Entitiesa As of
ISO14001 Certification 49,462 December 2002
SA8000 Certification 353 February 2004
Global Reporting Initiative
- in accordance with GRI guidelinesb 18 December 2003
- using GRI guidelines 366 December 2003
United Nations Global Compact 1,184c December 2003
Fair Labor Association
- participating companiesb 12 December 2003
- affiliated companies (licensees) 1,266 December 2003
Ethical Trading Initiative 34d December 2003
Sources: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003; ISO, SAI, GRI, Global Com-
pact, FLA and ETI Web sites. a Depending on the initiative concerned, these may
include TNCs, SMEs, factories or other establishments. b This category implies a
higher level of commitment to the initiatives norms and guidelines. c Most of
these companies are firms in developing countries. d Includes the Tea Sourcing
Partnership, which comprises 12 companies.
There appears to be a significant trade-off between quality and
scale. Some MSIs, such as the Clean Clothes Campaign and the
Worker Rights Consortium, employ comprehensive monitoring
and verification methods but engage with only a handful of com-
panies. In contrast, certain certification schemes such as
ISO14001 and SA8000 have expanded fairly rapidly but rely
heavily on large accounting and auditing firms whose methods
have been questionedcosts tend to be high (particularly for
small firms) and it is difficult for them to assess accurately and
objectively workplace conditions; labour, gender and commu-
nity relations; and environmental impacts.
Public-private partnerships and
the United Nations Global Compact
PPPs also bring together a range of stakeholders and encom-
pass a variety of arrangements where companies pool their re-
sources with governmental, intergovernmental and/or civil
society organizations (CSOs) to address specific development
tasks and goals. One subset of PPPs that has proliferated in
recent years has involved business and the United Nations
(UN), through mechanisms such as the Global Compact and
global health partnerships. The speed with which various UN
bodies and TNCs have embraced the partnership approach is
often seen as a positive sign not only that TNCs are channel-
ling more resources toward social and sustainable development,
but also that corporate citizenship, with its emphasis on shared
values, is progressing.
But the lack of attention to criteria and procedures for selecting
and screening corporate partners, and to monitoring and com-
pliance mechanisms, are downsides to the rapid proliferation of
PPPs. Partnerships provide opportunities for corporate image
enhancement and policy influence through privileged access to
developing country governments and multilateral organizations.
Many also constitute vehicles for market penetration, preferen-
tial access to developing country markets and other means of
increasing the competitive advantage of TNCs.
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The partnership approach often ignores some basic inconsist-
encies between the policy interests of developing countries and
those of TNCs. This emerges most clearly in relation to the glo-
bal macroeconomic policy regime, centred on trade and invest-
ment liberalization, which creates an enabling environment for
TNCs but often limits the development options and fiscal rev-
enues of developing country governments. TNCs and powerful
business lobbies actively support this regime and oppose the
types of policy reform proposed by many scholars, activists and
policy makers. UN-business partnerships provide TNCs with
opportunities to pursue their own policy interests within the
United Nations, and the organizations public purpose can be
undermined if it begins to promote policy goals preferred by
business when these are far from universally approved.
Corporate accountability
and international regulation
Concerns about the limits of CSR and voluntary initiatives have
resulted in renewed calls for corporate accountability and inter-
national regulation of TNCs. Since the 1980s, international regu-
lation of business has been characterized by two major imbal-
ances. First, multilateral co-operation has strengthened global
corporate property rights; in marked contrast, regulation related
to social obligations has taken place primarily at the national
level or through relatively weak forms of voluntary initiatives at
the global level. Second, while rules exist between the countries
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) in relation to investment, taxation and competi-
tion policy, these systems of regulation have not yet extended to
developing countries in a way that supports development.
The emerging corporate accountability agenda includes pro-
posals to establish institutional mechanisms that hold corpo-
rations to account, rather than simply urging companies to
improve standards or to report voluntarily. Corporate account-
ability initiatives promote complaints procedures, independ-
ent monitoring, compliance with national and international
law and other agreed standards, mandatory reporting and re-
dress for malpractice.
Examples of Corporate Accountability
Instruments, Proposals and Campaigns
! United Nations Norms on Responsibilities of
TNCs and Other Business Enterprises with
Regard to Human Rights (drafted in 2003)
! OECD Guidelines on Multinational Corporations
(revised in 2000)
! Aarhas Conventionmandatory environmental
reporting (approved in 2003)
! World Health Organization Framework Convention
on Tobacco Control (approved in 2003)
! United States Alien Tort Claims Act and trans-
national litigation (reactivated in the 1990s)
! Corporate Accountability Convention or Organiza-
tion (proposed in 2002)
! European Union Code of Conduct (resolution
passed in 2002)
! Publish What You Pay Campaign (launched in 2002)
! International Right to Know Campaign (launched
in 2003)
! Tax Justice Network (formed in 2003)
Complaints Procedures
Complaints procedures can assume numerous institu-
tional forms involving, for example, judicial and parlia-
mentary processes, collective bargaining and global
framework agreements between TNCs and international
trade union organizations, and NGO watchdog bodies
that name and shame companies in relation to specific
activities and practices. In recent years there has been a
diversification of complaints procedures, with the rise
of transnational litigation involving prosecutions of
TNCs for misconduct abroad, shareholder activism, con-
sumer boycotts and ombudsman initiatives. Some MSIs
have developed provisions for complaints procedures.
Several multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank,
International Labour Organization and OECD, and the
North American Free Trade Agreement, have also devel-
oped such procedures; in practice, however, they are
often weak. Through the recently drafted Norms on
Responsibilities of TNCs and Other Business Enterprises
with Regard to Human Rights, an attempt is under way
to develop standards and complaints procedures within
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.
The corporate accountability movement has put the spotlight
on certain issues that have not figured prominently, if at all, in
the mainstream CSR agenda but which are fundamental to the
role of TNCs in governance and development: corporate power;
perverse fiscal, financial and pricing practices; and corporate
lobbying for macroeconomic policies that can have negative de-
velopmental impacts.
The corporate accountability agenda emphasizes the need to re-
articulate voluntary and legal approaches. It seeks to re-estab-
lish the authority of states and intergovernmental institutions
over corporations; consolidate governance infrastructures involv-
ing CSOs and co-regulation; and strengthen workplace democ-
racy through workers organizations, recognition and respect of
labour rights, and new forms of participatory ownership.
To the extent that corporate accountability proposals pose a
challenge to corporate interests, they are likely to be resisted by
some business groups, political leaders and policy makers. Their
success will thus require the backing of a fairly powerful coali-
tion of forces. There are a few signs that such a coalition may be
in the making, with certain proposals now receiving the backing
of selected individuals and organizations associated with corpo-
rate interests, CSOs and networks, governmental and multilat-
eral organizations, and academic opinion.
The consolidation of such a coalition must, however, overcome
several tensions and constraints: relatively limited participation
of Southern groups in the relevant networks and campaigns;
ongoing tensions between NGOs and trade unions; limited ac-
countability and legitimacy of some NGOs and other organiza-
tions that are shaping MSIs and public policy; and the danger
that the participation of business interests in any corporate ac-
countability initiative or coalition may result in excessive dilu-
tion of proposals and/or co-optation.
Policy Implications
! Codes of conduct should be seen more as an area of political
contestation than a solution to the problems created by eco-
nomic globalization. Strategies are required to ensure that
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codes of conduct are complementary to government legisla-
tion and provide a space for workers to organize. This is more
likely to occur when they are a component of MSIs, rather
than when they are unilaterally developed by companies or
trade associations.
! There is an urgent need to define what a desirable interna-
tional regulatory regime would look like from the perspective
of developing countries. MSIs and proposals for international
regulation of TNCs need to be more sensitive to the priori-
ties, concerns and realities of various actors in developing
countries. The governance and membership structures of MSIs
and international campaigns and networks have to accommo-
date such interests.
! Because of the difficulties of scaling up codes of conduct and
voluntary reporting, auditing and certification systems, more
attention needs to be focused on complaints procedures to
detect, publicize, prosecute and otherwise deal with specific
breaches of agreed standards. This would involve MSIs devel-
oping such procedures, as well as strengthening a range of
other organizations and institutions, including, for example,
the rule of law, judicial processes, government inspection units,
watchdog NGOs, investigative media, trade unions, parliamen-
tary oversight committees, ombudsman-type arrangements,
and consumer and shareholder activism.
! The United Nations Global Compact should channel more
of its resources and energies to boosting the efforts of devel-
oping countries to improve labour, human rights and envi-
ronmental standards in ways that are in tune with national
development efforts and priorities. Issues of corporate tax
evasion and avoidance, transfer pricing and corporate lobby-
ing for economic policies that conflict with the development
interests of low-income countries require more attention.
! The United Nations needs to strengthen mechanisms for se-
lecting and screening corporations that enter into partner-
ship arrangements; for monitoring and evaluating such rela-
tionships; and for terminating collaboration with free-riders
and those that violate internationally agreed norms.
! The notion of UN-business partnership needs to be re-
thought. Developing countries require greater freedom to se-
lect both the level and kind of foreign direct investment that
is consistent with their economic situation and poverty reduc-
tion strategies. PPPs for development would promote corporate
investment, philanthropic, fiscal, pricing and lobbying poli-
cies and practices consistent with developing country strate-
gies and policy frameworks.
! The United Nations needs to counter the reality or perception
that it is soft on public regulation of TNCs and that it ignores
conflicts of interest and double standards practised by some
corporations. It should explore ways of articulating voluntary
and legal forms of regulation; strengthening the monitoring
and implementation procedures associated with relevant Inter-
national Labour Organization and international human rights
norms; promoting complaints procedures; and doing more to
encourage not only best-practice learning, but also critical re-
search on the developmental impacts of corporate activities.
! Because corporations are heavily constrained in their goals
and policies as a result of their accountability to financial
markets, and because many of the problems associated with
CSR result from patterns of ownership that concentrate wealth
and abuse the property rights of the relatively powerless, the
corporate responsibility agenda needs to pay more attention
to the role of the financial services industry and issues of prop-
erty ownership.
! Effective business regulation will occur only when it is backed
by an influential coalition of interests. Governments and
multilateral organizations should thus support the efforts of
CSOs, networks and movements that exert pressure on cor-
porations to behave responsibly, and should facilitate the par-
ticipation of Southern actors in global initiatives.
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